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In March 1917 the General Staff of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) issued SS. 148. Forward Inter-Communication in Battle, the army’s first authoritative training manual devoted entirely to the issue of communications. Encapsulating the lessons learnt from operations on the Somme the previous year, SS. 148 devoted just two pages to the matter of tank communications, with the explanation that since tank development was ‘still in an experimental stage… the best means of communication cannot be definitely laid down until further experience has been gained’. However, three months later the General Staff issued SS. 167. Signal Organisation for Heavy Branch Machine Gun Corps. Taking into account the experiences of the recent offensives at Arras and Messines Ridge, SS. 167 stated unequivocally that ‘a properly organised system of communications for Tanks is essential if full value is to be obtained from this arm’.​[1]​ Thus, within nine months of the tank’s debut, the British high command had come to realise that efficient communications were a prerequisite for the successful employment of tanks in battle.
However, despite this explicit acknowledgement of their importance, the issue of communications remains a practical aspect of British tank operations on the Western Front that, although frequently mentioned within the historiography, has not been considered by historians in any great detail.​[2]​ Even the regimental histories of the Tank Corps and the Royal Engineers Signal Service pay little attention to the development of tank communications during the First World War.​[3]​ This is a significant oversight because throughout the war tenuous communications had a profound impact on the tactical and operational effectiveness of tanks in action. This was due in part to the absence of efficient mobile, ‘real-time’ communications technology, which imposed profound restrictions on the ability of commanders of every arm, and in every army, to exercise command and control over their troops in the heat of battle, and also in part to the primitive nature of the tanks themselves. As one former British tank commander recalled after the war:

To be in action inside a tank is to be like an ostrich with its head in the sand. Except for the officer, who must take risks if he wants to direct his tank efficiently, the crew get only fleeting glimpses of the outside world over their gun sights. This poor visibility, coupled with the thumping of the engine and the muffled roar of the guns, which is absolutely deafening, cuts the crew off almost completely from the hideous sights and sounds of the battlefield.​[4]​


Given, then, the failure by historians to consider in depth the role and significance of British tank communications during the war, the question needs to be asked: to what extent did the BEF achieve ‘a properly organised system of communications for Tanks’ by the end of the war? In seeking to answer this question, this chapter aims to fill a gap in the historiography by examining the developmental process by which the BEF’s tank communications system evolved between 1916 and 1918. It adopts a chronological approach and argues that, although British commanders sought newer and better methods of conveying information in order to improve the BEF’s tank communications system, by 1918 poor communications continued to hamper British tank operations on the Western Front. Such a conclusion lends further support to the argument made by some historians that, given the limitations of the technology at the time, the finite resources available and the circumstances in which tank crews operated, it is difficult to see how the BEF could have made greater and more successful use of tanks during the First World War.​[5]​

1916: Rudimentary and ad hoc Experiments
Since the onset of trench warfare in the winter of 1914/15, tenuous communications had imposed profound restrictions on the ability of British commanders to exercise efficient command and control over their troops during the heat of battle. This was one of the principal findings of ‘The Committee on the Lessons of the Great War’ in October 1932 when highlighting the inherent difficulty that the BEF had had in attempting to convert a break-in to an enemy position into a break-through. Telephone and telegraph lines were routinely cut by enemy artillery fire, wireless was both rudimentary and extremely fragile, whilst visual signalling and message carriers were slow, dangerous and unreliable means of conveying information. At Neuve Chapelle and at Loos in 1915, and on the Somme on 1 July 1916, ‘once the battle was joined the higher command ceased to influence it’. In the absence of the smooth and rapid transfer of accurate information, vital decisions, such as committing reserves, were often made too late or not at all. Consequently, the momentum of the attack soon ground to a halt as opportunities to exploit any initial successes were lost and the Germans given ample time to call up their reserves and reinforce their defences.​[6]​  
The introduction of tanks into the BEF’s order of battle in September 1916, therefore, presented British commanders with a novel set of further communication dilemmas. Three channels of communication were necessary: first, tank-to-tank communication; second, communication between tanks and other arms with which they were working, particularly the infantry; and, third, communication between tanks and formation headquarters in the rear. With regards to the first of these, it quickly became apparent to the first tank crews that coordinating their machines with each other whilst in action was going to prove highly problematic. The noise and poor lighting within the tank made it difficult for tank crews to communicate with each other, let alone with the outside world. As Lieutenant Frank Mitchell, 1st Battalion, Tank Corps, recalled after the war: 

One of the drawbacks of tanks in battle is the total lack of any means of communication with other tanks. When once inside, with doors bolted, flaps shut and loop holes closed, one can only make signs to a tank very near at hand by taking the great risk of opening the manhole in the roof and waving a handkerchief or a shovel.​[7]​


Experiments with electric signalling lamps were conducted in mid-1916 and, along with coloured flags, laid down as the primary method of inter-tank signals to be used during to the battle of Flers-Courcelette on 15 September.​[8]​
This reliance on simple visual signals to facilitate tank-to-tank communication was born out of necessity, since wireless sets in 1916 did not render reception inside tanks possible ‘owing to noise and engine vibration’. With the transmission of human speech over radio waves (wireless telephony) at an early, experimental stage, the wireless sets employed by the BEF were ‘almost exclusively Morse-operated with crystals or magnetized tape-detection for receivers and arc or spark-gap radiation for transmission’.​[9]​ This meant that they were easily susceptible to damage, their operational range was limited and channel selectivity poor. Furthermore, very few sets could be employed on a given frontage without risk of mutual interference. Indeed, according to Major-General Sir Ernest Swinton, one of the tank’s foremost pioneers, it was this latter drawback that forced the BEF’s high command to abandon attempts to install and utilise wireless within tanks in 1916.​[10]​
In many respects, tank-to-tank communications during the latter stages of the Somme campaign were necessarily ad-hoc and experimental. Since a ‘section commander’s job was to be where he could be of most use to the infantry while still keeping control of his tanks’, many found that they had no alternative but to lead their tanks into action on foot, or climb out of their tank in order to give verbal instructions to another tank’s commander.​[11]​ Such was the case on 18 November near Beaumont-Hamel, when the future Tank Corps’ chief intelligence officer, Captain (later Major) Elliot Hotblack, won the Distinguished Service Order for personally guiding a stray tank towards a German strongpoint whilst under heavy fire.​[12]​
Arrangements for communications between tanks and other arms were, though, more clearly defined. In August, a General Headquarters (GHQ) memorandum, entitled ‘Preliminary Notes on Tactical Employment of Tanks’, stressed the particular necessity for infantry ‘to cooperate closely with the tanks’. The specific details of this cooperation were worked out at a Fourth Army Conference on 10 September and issued as ‘Instructions for the Employment of “Tanks”’ the following day. The ‘Instructions’ stipulated that communication from tanks to infantry was to be facilitated chiefly by the use of coloured flags: a red flag would indicate that the tank was ‘out of action’, while a green flag would denote ‘am on objective’.​[13]​ Despite these provisions, however, time constraints and the inadequate number of tanks available meant that infantry-tank training prior to the battle of Flers-Courcelette was both haphazard and restricted, which partly explains why tank-infantry cooperation on the Somme was, on the whole, not a resounding success.​[14]​ 
Arrangements were also put into place to facilitate communication between tanks and aeroplanes. Following the first-ever instance of tank-aeroplane cooperation during the battle of Morval on 26 September, for instance, 2nd Division issued instructions in late October detailing the work to be carried out by assigned signallers, who would ‘operate a lamp through the roof’ of their respective tanks in order to send information regarding the infantry’s advance to contact aeroplanes flying above.​[15]​ However, the absence of clear visibility due to rain and low cloud during the closing weeks of the Somme campaign greatly hampered such work. Reflecting on the limited success of operations during this period, for example, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, GOC Fourth Army, noted in his diary that ‘the absence of observation from the air has I think been enough to account for our failure’.​[16]​
With regards to communications between tanks and formation headquarters in the rear, it was decided that a proportion of fighting tanks were to be provided with two carrier pigeons to serve this purpose. The Carrier Pigeon Service had become an established branch of the BEF’s Signal Service at the beginning of June 1915, following the successful employment of carrier pigeons during the Second Battle of Ypres, and grew rapidly in size to incorporate 20,000 pigeons and some 380 handlers by 1918.​[17]​ Pigeons were much less susceptible to shell fire and the effects of poison gas than human despatch riders and runners, and in good weather could travel at speeds of 40-60 miles per hour.​[18]​ However, the poisonous and sweltering interior conditions within First World War tanks could make the use of carrier pigeons problematic. As Lieutenant Frank Mitchell noted after the war:

The poor pigeons were taken into action in a basket which, for lack of room, was often placed on top of the engine. In the heat and excitement of a battle they were sometimes overlooked, and when the basket was opened at last there emerged a decidedly overheated and semi-asphyxiated bird.​[19]​


Nevertheless, according to Colonel (later Brigadier-General) Christopher Baker-Carr, commanding 1st Tank Brigade (1917-18), the use of carrier pigeons at Flers-Courcelette was ‘found to be the most rapid means of communication from the battle’. Much depended, though, on the value of the information contained within the message a pigeon was carrying. Baker-Carr recalled in his memoirs, for instance, an amusing incident during the closing stages of the Somme campaign in mid-November when a carrier pigeon flew into the loft at XIII Corps headquarters, whereupon the corps commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Congreve, eagerly opened the message to read: ‘I’m just about fed up with carrying this perishing bird… It can bleeding well go home. Signed John Brown, Pte.’.​[20]​ 
	It can be concluded, therefore, that the BEF’s tank communications system in 1916 was both extemporary and rudimentary in nature. The provision and maintenance of communications for tanks added yet more pressure to an army already struggling to develop an efficient communications system capable of meeting the demands of a modern, industrialised conflict.​[21]​ Moreover, the introduction of tanks into the BEF’s order of battle also brought further disruption to the communication networks of other arms. As Sergeant J. Sawers, 2nd New Zealand Brigade Signal Section, recalled after the war, the tanks at Flers-Courcelette ‘chewed up’ infantry and artillery telephone lines during the course of the battle – ‘a historic first for a subsequently far too frequent occurrence’.​[22]​

1917: A Year of Steady Improvements
Taking into account the lessons learnt from the initial tank operations on the Somme, considerable ingenuity was applied in attempts to improve the BEF’s tank communications system throughout 1917, though to varying degrees of success. These attempts mirrored those by the BEF as a whole, for although the offensives of 1917 failed to break the stalemate on the Western Front they did demonstrate the growing tactical and operational sophistication of British fighting methods.​[23]​
	Of the three principal channels of communication required by tanks, tank-to-tank communications underwent the least dramatic improvement during 1917. This was due largely to the primitive nature of the communication technologies of the era and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of getting such devices to work successfully from within the confines of equally primitive armoured fighting vehicles. Indeed, following the battle of Arras in May 1917, it was noted that, ‘owing to the extreme noise inside Tanks, Tank Commanders found the greatest difficulty in communicating instructions to their crews’. It was suggested, therefore, that ‘some form of speaking tube’ was required to rectify the problem.​[24]​ However, it was remarked after the war that speaking tubes had been found ‘quite useless, as they become red-hot, so that no one can touch them’. The majority of tank crews simply relied on shouting to each other whilst in action or using whistles to attract the driver’s attention.​[25]​ Prearranged hand signals amongst crew members also became common practice, especially when attempting to coordinate the rather complicated procedure of changing the direction the tank was moving in:

First of all, the tank had to stop. A knock on the right side would attract the attention of the right gearsman. The driver would hold out a clenched fist, which was the signal to put the track into neutral. The gearsman would repeat the signal to show it was done. The officer, who controlled two brake levers, would pull on the right one, which held the right track. The driver would accelerate, and the tank would slew round slowly on the stationary right track while the left track went into motion. As soon as the tank had turned sufficiently the procedure was reversed.​[26]​


Clearly the issue of internal tank communications was just as important as communication between tanks, since the smooth and efficient running of a tank relied a great deal on the close interaction and cooperation of the crew itself.​[27]​ 
	Tank-to-tank communication in 1917 was accomplished chiefly by the medium of visual signalling. Each tank carried three coloured discs or lights – red, white and green – placed vertically on the side of the tank. Read from the top downwards, inter-tank signals would always begin by utilising the white disc or light first, while tank-infantry signals would start with either the green or red disc. A single white disc, for example, conveyed the message ‘forward, or come on’, three white discs denoted ‘concentrate on rallying point’, while three red discs indicated the tank had broken down.​[28]​ As crude as these coloured disc and light signals were, post-battle reports of the fighting at Arras confirmed that they had ‘proved useful’, with ‘many messages [having been] sent from Tank to Tank’.​[29]​ However, given the climatic and topographic conditions that generally prevailed on the Western Front, visual signalling was a precarious form of communication.​[30]​ Fog, rain, dust and smoke, in particular, rendered the reading of simple coloured discs and lights on tanks extremely difficult. Therefore, just as on the Somme the previous year, many section commanders continued to deliver messages to each other personally and guide their tanks into action on foot. The most noteworthy example of the latter occurred on 4 October during the battle of Broodseinde at Ypres, when Captain Clement Robertson walked in front of his leading tanks, guiding them onto their objective whilst under heavy fire. Although he was killed in the process, he was awarded a Victoria Cross, the first for the Tank Corps during the war.​[31]​
	Although the system of communication between tanks and other arms also did not undergo any radical transformation during the course of 1917, British commanders continued to stress the necessity for closer cooperation and improved methods of communication. As early as February, Major J.F.C. Fuller, chief staff officer of the Heavy Branch Machine Gun Corps, recognised that tanks had to ‘work hand in glove with the other arms’, and that successful cooperation could not be achieved without a rapid and efficient communications system. This point was reiterated following the battle of Arras, as SS. 164. Notes on the Use of Tanks made clear: ‘With Tanks, as with any other arm, satisfactory results can only be obtained by the close co-operation of all arms’.​[32]​ This was particularly so with regards to tank-infantry cooperation. Summing up some of the chief lessons learnt as a result of the fighting at Arras, Messines and Third Ypres, a Tank Corps report in late October stressed that ‘[t]he closest possible liaison must exist between the Tank Units and the Infantry’, and that ‘[t]his co-operation must be established right down to the Tank Commanders and the Infantry Battalions’.​[33]​ This continuing emphasis on improved tank-infantry liaison was to pay-off at the battle of Cambrai the following month. As a 1st Tank Brigade report noted: ‘The success of the early part of the Battle was largely due to the close co-operation with the Infantry’.​[34]​ Improved means of tank-infantry communication were therefore imperative if better cooperation was to be achieved, and so existing methods were modified and new ideas tried and tested throughout the year. 
Coloured disc or light signals, for instance, similar to those employed for tank-to-tank communication, were used to convey simple information from tanks to supporting infantry units, replacing the system of coloured flags used on the Somme.​[35]​ According to SS. 148, all infantrymen had to know the following three general signals by heart: first, a single red disc or light, which meant ‘danger, or wire uncut’; second, a single green disc or light, which denoted ‘come on, or wire cut’; and, third, a red and green disc or light, which indicated ‘wait’. The infantry were to acknowledge receipt of such tank signals by ‘waving the rifle with bayonet fixed, from side to side above the head’. The fundamental method used by infantry to call for tank assistance, meanwhile, was made ‘by placing the helmet on the end of the fixed bayonet and raising it straight above the head to the full extent of the Rifle’. Although dangerous, it was largely successful and so remained standard practice for the remainder of the war.​[36]​
If disc signals were not employed, or if they failed to attract the attention of the infantry, then the only other method for tanks to let the infantry know that they had achieved their objective and that it was safe for them to advance was by waving a shovel out of the manhole in the roof.​[37]​ Although this worked reasonably well, there were many occasions when the infantry complained that they had had great difficulty in noticing such a signal.​[38]​ Attempts to rectify this problem varied throughout the year. A report by XVIII Corps in August, for example, suggested that ‘a more distinctive signal should be used in future’, while Major-General George Harper, GOC 51st Division, stressed after the Battle of Cambrai in November that infantry ‘must be within signalling distance’ of the tanks they followed. The only other alternative was for a tank commander to leave his tank, or send one of his men, and deliver a message to the infantry in person, a hazardous and time-consuming endeavour.​[39]​ 
	While tank-to-tank and tank-infantry communication remained somewhat crude, the system of communication between tanks and formation headquarters in the rear underwent a significant number of developments in 1917. At Arras the principal device employed for communication between tanks and rear headquarters was the Aldis Daylight Signalling Lamp. Introduced into the BEF in 1916, the Aldis Lamp was a powerful electric signalling apparatus requiring large accumulators. Although it was not portable enough for use within the infantry, it was ideally suited for tank and aeroplane communication.​[40]​ Each pair of tanks carried an Aldis Lamp and a trained signaller to operate it. Upon reaching a rallying point, messages from tanks were sent using Morse code to a tank battalion transmitting station, located at a pre-determined position on the Black Line (first objective). The station consisted of an officer and a party of signallers and runners, and had to be within easy runner distance of company headquarters, yet also be in a suitable position to observe operations on the Blue Line (second objective).​[41]​ Information received at the transmitting station was passed onto company headquarters, either by telephone or by runner, and then sent up the chain of command through divisional and corps telephone exchanges.​[42]​ Liaison officers drawn from each battalion were also employed to work between Tank Brigade headquarters and divisional, corps and corps heavy artillery headquarters. These liaison officers were required to have ‘a good knowledge of Tank Tactics and of the capabilities of Tanks, distances they can travel without re-filling… and intimate knowledge of the scheme of operations of the whole Brigade’.​[43]​
	Post-battle reports concerning tank-to-rear headquarters communication at Arras were mostly positive, although four key issues were identified. Firstly, the Aldis Lamps proved their value on several occasions but ‘require[d] a bracket outside the Tank to which they could be attached and worked from the inside’.​[44]​ Of more pressing concern, however, were the difficulties caused by inadequate Aldis Lamp training in some battalions. According to the commander of ‘C’ Battalion, Heavy Branch Machine Gun Corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Sydney Charrington, officers and signallers ‘require more training in wording their messages concisely, and intelligibly. Messages were received of a very vague character’.​[45]​ This, however, was a problem that affected not just the Tank Corps but the BEF as a whole throughout the war.​[46]​
	The second issue to emerge from the Battle of Arras concerned the means of communication available to tanks. The most efficient method of communication between tanks and rear headquarters appears to have been carrier pigeons. As supply was limited, two pigeons were allotted to each pair of tanks prior to the battle, though they were ‘to be used at discretion’ and only ‘in cases of great emergency’.​[47]​ However, not only were details of the infantry’s advance ‘in several cases first notified by means of Tank pigeons’, and thereby proving they were ‘the only reliable means of communication’,​[48]​ but according to a report by the 1st Tank Brigade, their efficiency ‘would have been doubly more so if more pigeons had been made available’. The report suggested that if each tank carried four pigeons ‘there should be no difficulty whatsoever in sending back quick and accurate information’.​[49]​ Carrier pigeons subsequently formed the backbone of the system of information transfer between frontline tanks and formation headquarters for the remainder of the year.​[50]​ At Cambrai, for instance, pigeons proved of considerable value to the 1st Tank Brigade, who sent and received over 38 messages on the first day of the battle alone. It was noted afterwards that ‘[a]lthough the weather conditions were very adverse, fairly good results were obtained on the first day… From the loft, messages were telephoned to the 1st Brigade Headquarters and a Despatch Rider brought in the originals every half hour’.​[51]​ 
The third issue to emerge from the Battle of Arras was the widespread call for ‘Signal Tanks’. It was suggested that in future operations such tanks would act as mobile transmitting stations, equipped with an array of communication means, including pigeons, lamps and wireless, and consist of highly trained personnel. As Colonel Christopher Baker-Carr argued:

The introduction of a Signal Tank will not only enable Tanks to communicate with their own H.Q. but with those of the Divisions and Corps and especially with the Artillery H.Q. Further, the introduction of such a Tank will form a mobile signal station for the infantry as well as for the Tanks themselves. Runners will be economized and the laying of cables and telephone lines reduced.​[52]​ 


Experiments with signal tanks were initiated shortly thereafter at the Central Workshops at Erin, using a number of Mark I and Mark II tanks, yielding ‘most promising results’. According to SS. 167, ‘[t]he intention is to employ Wireless between the Signal Tanks at rallying points and fixed Wireless Stations erected at any suitable HQ such as an Infantry Brigade… It is expected that Signal Tanks will be able to accept messages, from Infantry and other units, for transmission to the rear by Wireless’.​[53]​ Although British officers were clearly eager and enthusiastic, it must not be forgotten that wireless technology remained in its infancy. So, too, did the tanks themselves. Thus, in many respects the application of wireless to tanks during the First World War can aptly be described as ‘an experiment inside an experiment’, requiring constant modification and change, resulting in ‘many initial failures’.​[54]​
	Indeed, as a result of a conference held at the headquarters of the Heavy Branch Machine Gun Corps on 9 July, it was decided that nine signal tanks fitted with wireless would be made available for the upcoming Third Ypres campaign.​[55]​ Of the nine tanks allotted, only four were actually employed on the opening day of the battle on 31 July. Divided equally between ‘C’ Tank Battalion (15th Division) and ‘F’ Tank Battalion (55th Division), two wireless sets were used as forward transmitting stations and two as back receiving stations. Their purpose was twofold: first, to send back ‘immediate tactical information… in regard to the progress of the battle’; and, second, ‘to inform the [Royal] Flying Corps Headquarters of the number and location of hostile machines and of the progress of aerial fighting’. The results, however, were disappointing. The tank carrying the forward transmitting set in C Battalion suffered mechanical problems and had to be ditched, while the forward transmitting set in F Battalion was found to be faulty and so no messages were sent. Undeterred by these setbacks, signal tanks carrying wireless sets were utilised on several further occasions in August and September, with more favourable results. The converted Wilson spark transmitter and Mark III receivers employed gave ‘strong signals over a distance of 15,000 yards’. In mid-August, it was noted that, as a result of wireless messages sent from signal tanks, ‘very material benefit was obtained by the R.F.C. who were thus able to accelerate communication between their observers and Headquarters by about one hour’.​[56]​ 
	These successes ensured that of the 476 tanks massed for the Cambrai offensive on 20 November, nine were fitted with wireless (one per tank battalion) and one carried telephone cable. The wireless tanks were made available for use by tank, infantry and artillery units, carrying sets which had to be offloaded and erected at preselected sites.​[57]​ During the initial advance ‘several messages containing valuable information’ were received from these wireless tanks, such as that pertaining to the capture of Marcoing, sent only ten minutes after infantry from 6th Division had entered the village.​[58]​ However, it was widely acknowledged by tank and infantry commanders after the battle that a far greater proportion of wireless messages could have been sent. A report by 1st Tank Brigade attributed this failure to two factors: first, to the wireless sets employed, which were described as ‘only makeshift and exceedingly clumsy, especially in view of the fact that they were taken in Fighting Tanks’; and, second, to the arrangements under which the wireless equipment was transported. It cited one occasion when the wireless apparatus was divided between two tanks and one of the tanks broke down, rendering the set useless. In another incident, the equipment was again divided between two tanks but before it could be utilised one of the tanks was ‘knocked out’ by enemy shellfire.​[59]​ Thus, although some notable successes had been achieved with regards to the gradual employment of wireless in tanks during 1917, there were still a number of pressing issues that would need to be resolved if communication between tanks and rear headquarters was to become more rapid and efficient the following year. 
	The fourth, and final, issue to emerge from Arras was the provision and maintenance of communications between the various tank formation headquarters and the rest of the BEF. Since the concentration of tanks could not take place until it was known where and when an offensive would take place, and if, and how many, tanks were required, it was impossible to allocate a permanent system of telegraph and telephone lines to link tank formation headquarters. In late 1916 and early 1917 tank formation headquarters simply connected themselves to the lines already provided, operated and maintained by the infantry brigade, division and corps signal companies, and so tank units had only a very small number of linesmen to maintain and repair their own lines.​[60]​ Consequently, faults on tank formation lines were commonplace and communication between headquarters severely impaired. As one tank brigade commander bemoaned after the Battle of Arras: ‘The telephone system with which we worked can only be described as heart-breaking. Many times it was totally impossible to hear or to be heard when speaking to Corps H.Q. at a distance of 5 or 6 miles’.​[61]​ Throughout 1917, then, signal companies were raised in order to provide, maintain and operate communications for and between Tank Corps headquarters and each tank brigade. Gradually, the system improved but it was still far from perfect at the end of the year. A post-battle report following the operations at Cambrai in December observed that more direct telephone lines to units of the Tank Corps should be made available, since ‘Divisional and Infantry Brigade lines were very much congested and delay in getting through often occurred… It is therefore necessary that the greater part of the [Tank Corps telephone] system be built at very short notice by the Tank Brigade Signal Company’.​[62]​ 
The other chief problem experienced at Cambrai was the extensive damage to telephone and telegraph lines caused by tanks. Prior to the offensive, special crossing places, where tank paths intersected cable routes, were constructed using poles to lift the lines 15 feet off the ground so that tanks could pass safely underneath them. Tanks fitted with fascines for clearing the wide trenches of the Hindenburg defences required a larger clearance of 20 feet. However, labour constraints meant that not enough of these crossings were built. Moreover, many tank units were simply not provided with enough information from the Signal Service pertaining to the exact location of these crossings. Once the battle began, tanks crushed and ripped apart these poled cable routes as well as those laid by the advancing infantry, impeding the rapid transmission of orders, reports and other vital information.​[63]​ According to one account, ‘the poles… chosen on account of lightness for easy transport, were very easily broken. They should… have been longer, to raise the cable high enough to clear the Tanks’.​[64]​ Several suggestions as how best to overcome this problem in future operations were provided after the battle. For example, while Major-General Douglas-Smith, GOC 20th Division, believed that ‘routes for returning Tanks should be laid down and marked back to the original front line’ in order to guide tank commanders away from vulnerable telephone lines, a Third Army report argued that special tanks, capable of carrying about 10 tons, and cutting a trench about 3 inches wide and 1 foot deep’, should be provided for use by the Signal Service. Such tanks were to ‘be fitted with a means of paying out multi-core cable from drums through a hawse pipe into the trench as it is cut’, and ‘all the apparatus for using the Tank as a Signal Office should also be provided’.​[65]​ Thus, one of the principal lessons to emerge from the battles of 1917, particularly Cambrai, was the necessity for much closer liaison between the Tank Corps and the Signal Service. This had begun with the creation of signal companies for the Tank Corps and tank brigades, and was later cemented by the appointment of an Assistant-Director of Signals (AD Signals) for the Tank Corps, Lieutenant-Colonel J.D.N. Molesworth, whose task it was to supervise the tank signal companies and coordinate their efforts with the Signal Service, resulting in an improved system of communication for future Tank Corps operations.​[66]​

1918: Innovations and the Challenges of Mobile Warfare
The war on the Western Front in 1918 fell into two main phases. The first phase, March to July, saw the German Army initiate a series of offensives against the BEF and its Allies, inflicting heavy losses and forcing them to retreat some 40 miles in the process, though ultimately failing to achieve a decisive victory. In the second phase, August to November, the BEF and its Allies mounted a series of offensives of their own, known collectively as the ‘Hundred Days’ campaign, the success of which eventually compelled the German Army to request an armistice.​[67]​ The return of semi-mobile warfare to the Western Front after over three years of trench stalemate provided the BEF’s Tank Corps with the ideal opportunity to build upon its successful performance at the Battle of Cambrai. However, as in 1916 and 1917, the ability of tanks to make a significant contribution to British operations in 1918 depended a great deal on the efficiency, integrity and speed of the communications system that supported them. 
	The methods employed to facilitate tank-to-tank communication in 1918 remained much as they had the previous year. Although use was made of coloured discs, flags and Aldis Lamps, it appears that many section commanders were often obliged to communicate with each other face-to-face, or to send a runner with a message, and to guide their tanks on foot, particularly during the ‘Hundred Days’.​[68]​ One tank commander recalled after the war his experience of trying to coordinate the movement of his section whilst supporting Australian infantry during a night attack at Amiens in August:

Getting the tanks to go forward again was no easy job. I began with the rear tank, and had to batter on the front with my stick to attract the attention of the officer inside. It was like trying to turn a car in a narrow road, and there was a good deal of manoeuvring and reversing and shouting before the second and third tanks were finally turned… I felt rather like a wild animal tamer with huge beasts to control. In the dark the tank crews could not easily understand my directions nor hear my voice above the noise.​[69]​


Some company commanders were also urged to convey orders and other important information in-person, either on horseback or, during the last months of the war, in a Medium A (or ‘Whippet’) tank. As Brigadier-General John Hardress-Lloyd, GOC 3rd Tank Brigade, reported in early September: ‘It is clearly demonstrated that the Commander of a Whippet Company can best command his Unit by moving freely amongst the Whippets under his command. The Company Commander requires a mounted Orderly. He also requires a spare horse’.​[70]​ Clearly the rudimentary nature of First World War British tanks, as well as the more fluid conditions that prevailed on the Western Front in the summer and autumn of 1918, militated against the successful application of more technologically sophisticated means of communication to convey important tactical information between tanks whilst in action.
	Good communications between tanks and the other arms were deemed ‘essential for success’ in the more mobile operations that the BEF found itself fighting in 1918.​[71]​ The signalling arrangements between tanks and infantry, for instance, were worked out at a conference held at Tank Corps headquarters on 5 June. Three flag signals were agreed: first, a tricolour flag (red, white and blue) would help infantry distinguish British tanks from German tanks, and would be flown when tanks were coming out of action or moving to the rear; second, a green and white flag, which indicated to the infantry ‘come on’; and, third, a red and yellow flag, informing the infantry ‘Tank broken down, go on’. The standard method used by infantry to attract the attention of tanks remained a helmet raised on a fixed bayonet.​[72]​ These means of tank-infantry communication persisted until the war’s end. Although they proved generally successful, a number of problems were experienced. A post-war report by the 3rd Tank Group, for example, acknowledged that while ‘the only method which has stood the test of time has been a few simple flag signals’, adverse weather conditions, dust and smoke made it ‘almost impossible’ for infantry to read such signals. Likewise, many tank commanders found it difficult to detect infantry waving their rifles with helmets attached, ‘as their attention is taken up by so many other details’ during the course of a battle. It was suggested that ‘when the helmets are put on rifles by the Infantry, they should if possible be hoisted two or three at a time’.​[73]​
	A range of alternative tank-infantry signalling methods were also tried and tested, with mixed results. Smoke grenades fired by the infantry to point tanks in the direction of enemy strong points and machineguns that needed destroying were found to be ‘unsatisfactory and confusing in the heat of battle’. The provision of bell pulls, first trialled at Ypres in July 1917 and reintroduced almost a year later at Hamel, met ‘with fair success’.​[74]​ Infantry would pull on a length of wire hanging out of the back of a tank which was connected to a bell inside the tank, attracting the crew’s attention when rung. The positions of the bell and the bell pull, however, were found to be ‘useless’, since ‘the former is too near the rear part of the Tank, and the latter is too near the exhaust’.​[75]​ More successful than either smoke grenades or bell pulls was the provision of an infantryman (usually an NCO) to ride in the back of a tank and act as observer between his unit and the tank crew. According to the instructions of the Canadian Corps prior to the battle of Amiens, this man was to ‘be responsible for watching the Infantry advance and the Infantry Signals and keeping the Tank Commander informed as to the Infantry progress and requirements’. It was also his responsibility to operate the signals from the tank to the infantry.​[76]​
	Even more problematic than tank-infantry liaison was the coordination of tanks and aeroplanes. ‘Notes on Co-operation between Tanks and Aeroplanes’, issued on 30 June, highlighted ‘the outstanding difficulty… of communication between Tanks and Aeroplanes’ during active operations, recommending that ‘[a]ll methods [of communication] must be tried, and practice will show which are the most reliable’.​[77]​ Although a variety of visual signals were tried and tested, including flares, smoke bombs, discs and Very lights, it was found that ‘signals from Tanks to aeroplanes are considered to be of little practical value and are not advised’.​[78]​ Direct voice communication between individual tanks and aeroplanes was simply not feasible given the inadequacies of the technology available. While the introduction of Continuous Wave (CW) wireless in 1917-18 provided the BEF with sets that were smaller, lighter and more powerful than their spark counterparts, not only were they in limited supply but they still could not function properly inside tanks due to excessive noise and engine vibration.​[79]​ However, CW did provide the British and Allied forces with the opportunity to experiment with wireless telephony. At a conference held at RAF headquarters on 18 July, not only was the issue of wireless telephony between aeroplanes discussed but it was also recognised that there was ‘a large field of usefulness for wireless telephones from air to ground principally in connection with reconnaissance, counter attack patrol work, and cooperation with Tanks’. Tests conducted throughout the summer revealed that ‘it is quite practicable to speak from Tank to Tank or from aeroplane to Tank’, but the operational range was limited to approximately 500 yards and further experiments were necessary ‘to get the most efficient aerial to suit all requirements’.​[80]​ Thus, tank-aeroplane and tank-to-tank communication by wireless telephony remained at a basic, experimental stage when the war ended. 
Aeroplanes were of much greater value as a means of facilitating communication between tanks and rear headquarters. During the Third Ypres campaign in 1917, white 18-inch square boards placed on the roofs of tanks enabled aerial observers of the RFC to identify those tanks that had been ditched, knocked-out or broken down whilst in action. Post-battle reports, however, suggested that they were far from effective.​[81]​ By early 1918, then, the decision had been made to paint a mark of three bars (white-red-white) on the top and sides of tanks, so as airmen could distinguish between British tanks and captured British tanks used by the Germans and, also, to enable aerial observers to report on the progress of tanks by dropping messages at rear headquarters.​[82]​ This method had been introduced during the Battle of the Somme in 1916 to keep corps and divisional headquarters informed of the progress of the infantry. As Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash explained after the war:

… the observer would mark down by conventional signs on a map the actual positions of our Infantry, of enemy Infantry or other facts of prime importance, and he often had time to scribble a few informative notes also. The “plane” then flew back at top speed to Corps H.Q., and the map, with or without an added report, was dropped in the middle of an adjacent field, wrapped in a weighted streamer of many colours. It was then brought by cyclist into the Staff Office.


According to the Australian Corps commander, this was ‘a vastly superior method’ of maintaining ‘actual battle control’, since ‘[t]he total time which elapsed between the making of the observation at the front line and the arrival of the information in the hands of the Corps Staff was seldom more than ten minutes’.​[83]​
When applied to the Tank Corps in the summer and autumn of 1918, it proved just as successful. No. 8 Squadron, RAF, commanded by Major Trafford Leigh-Mallory, was detailed to undertake such work during the Battle of Amiens on 8 August, dropping news of progress at the advanced Tank Corps headquarters. Although headquarters were ‘well posted with information’ throughout the opening day of the battle, difficulties occurred during the subsequent days’ fighting, as Leigh-Mallory recorded: ‘It became practically impossible to communicate with the Tank Battalions, and very difficult to get in touch with the Brigades. Distances were great, the roads were bad, and blocked with traffic, and it was naturally impossible to communicate by phone’.​[84]​ Undeterred, however, the method was revised and adopted with success by the 3rd Tank Brigade during its attacks on the Drocourt-Quéant Line on 2 September. As noted in an after-action report: 

An Aeroplane Dropping Ground was established at the Rallying Point… and with the exception of one message, which was considerably delayed by an Operator’s error, the messages were received at the Brigade Signal Office at the very satisfactory average time of 20 minutes after being dropped.


During the battle of the St. Quentin Canal at the end of the month, the 3rd Tank Brigade improvised once more, this time using a wireless tank as an advanced dropping station for messages from cooperating aeroplanes. According to the Tank Corps chief of staff, J.F.C. Fuller, ‘this proved a most useful innovation, for one aeroplane dropping its message at this station found, on its return home, that this message had been received by the headquarters to which it was directed within a few minutes of it having been dropped, in fact, far quicker than it would have been had the aeroplane dropped it at the headquarters itself’.​[85]​
	While contact aeroplanes provided a steady flow of information from the battlefield to rear headquarters, the same cannot be said of carrier pigeons. Although they had formed the mainstay of the communication system between tanks and rear headquarters in 1916-17, pigeons were of limited value in the more mobile operations experienced by the BEF during the ‘Hundred Days’ because once pigeon lofts were moved forward in accordance with the general advance the birds had to be re-trained in order to get accustomed to their new route – a process that took a minimum of six weeks to accomplish.​[86]​ Instead of having to repeatedly re-train carrier pigeons, however, many units chose to keep the lofts where they were. The downside to this, as noted by Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler, GOC III Corps, was that ‘in the latter stages of the operations, when the lofts were a considerable distance from the line and the birds were taking anything from an hour to an hour and a half to fly from the frontline to the lofts’, the messages ‘proved absolutely valueless’ as a result of the time delay.​[87]​ Indeed, a report by the 4th Tank Brigade regarding communications during the battle of Amiens in August stated that the quickest time that a carrier pigeon message reached the brigade headquarters from a frontline tank was 49 minutes, while the longest time recorded was 3 hours and 52 minutes. Later that month, the 1st Tank Brigade also noted that pigeons were taking on average 55 minutes to reach their destination. Thus, as a report by the 2nd Tank Brigade summed up in November, owing to the rapidity of the British advance and the long time entailed in sending information by carrier pigeons, ‘it will never be possible to count on this form of communication’.​[88]​
	It was under these circumstances that wireless came to the fore as a prominent means of communication in the Tank Corps. As Major E.F. Churchill, a signal officer with the 1st Tank Brigade, noted after the war, ‘communications [during the ‘Hundred Days’] were stretching a tremendous distance and if it had not been for wireless we could not have maintained them’.​[89]​ CW wireless, in particular, proved an indispensable asset. During the Battle of Amiens, the 3rd Tank Brigade reported that ‘in one case, a communication from Advanced H.Q. Tank Corps, sent by Wireless, Wire, and by D[espatch].R[ider]. arrived – by Wireless 1 hour before the Wire, and 1 ¼ hours before the D.R.’, while in late August the 1st Tank Brigade observed that messages were sent by wireless tanks and received at control stations over a distance of 13.5 miles, giving ‘excellent results’. As a post-war report by the 3rd Tank Group testified: ‘If a good [wireless] tank is well forward where information can easily reach it, and is well and bravely handled, there is no question that the information sent back is of the greatest value, and much in advance of any other method yet tried in the Tank Corps’.​[90]​
	In spite of these successes, however, the Tank Corps’ use of wireless in the summer and autumn of 1918 was still not problem-free. For instance, although Mark V and Mark IV ‘Baggage’ tanks were found to be the most suitable tanks for carrying wireless equipment, the former tended to damage the sets they carried, on account of the set being transported in the rear of the tank with the aerial run out behind, while the latter tank was too slow to keep up with the speed of the attack. A report by the 4th Tank Brigade following the Battle of Amiens, for example, stated that three out of the four wireless tanks allotted to the brigade ‘had engine trouble at some point during the operations… [and] were not fast enough for the pace of the advance’. Despite acknowledging that wireless communication itself ‘proved very satisfactory’, the report concluded that by the end of the first day ‘the distance over which they were working was too great, and the directing stations were moved forward… and an additional station was erected’.​[91]​ Poor weather conditions also hampered the Tank Corps’ efforts to make the most of wireless communication. During the Battle of the St. Quentin Canal on 29 September, for example, the 3rd Tank Brigade reported that although its wireless tank produced ‘very satisfactory results, dense mist reacted against the efficient working of the system’.​[92]​
	It was also often the case that when telephonic communication between the various report centres and connecting headquarters remained unbroken wireless was not used as much. Standard practice during the ‘Hundred Days’ was to establish a forward central telephone exchange at an advanced tank brigade command post. Cable tanks would then connect this command post to the main divisional cable-head, thus enabling direct telephonic communication between the command post, tank battalions and Tank Brigade headquarters.​[93]​ By the end of September, tank battalion and company commanders usually attached themselves respectively to the headquarters of the infantry brigades and battalions they were supporting, ‘where they were better able to keep in touch with events, and where they could easily be found’.​[94]​ Thus, although British commanders in 1918 were clearly receptive to new methods of communication, they still found it difficult to completely let go of their trench-bound communication habits.​[95]​

Conclusion
What, then, does this survey of the development of British tank communications during the First World War tell us about its relative importance in the success of tank operations? How successful were the British in achieving ‘a properly organized system of communications for Tanks’ by the end of the war? There can certainly be no doubting the significance of communications for tanks. In his account of tanks in the war, Fuller wrote: 

The importance of signaling in a formation such as the Tank Corps cannot be over-estimated, and this importance will increase as more rapid-moving machines are introduced, for, unless messages can be transmitted backwards and forwards without delay, many favorable opportunities for action, especially the action of reserves, will be lost. Making the most of time is the basis of all success, and this cannot be accomplished unless the commander is in the closest touch with his fighting and administrative troops and departments.​[96]​


Fuller’s sentiments were echoed several years later by General Heinz Guderian, one of the chief pioneers in the development of German armoured warfare doctrine during the interwar period. According to Guderian, himself a signal officer in the German Army during the First World War: ‘In the World War the shortcomings of the signals and communications systems greatly impeded the command of tank forces, and their cooperation with other arms… Here is the origin of the accusation that tanks are “deaf”’.​[97]​ Although both Fuller’s and Guderian’s observations must be treated with a degree of skepticism given their unwavering faith in the significance of tanks and mechanization, their conclusions are nonetheless correct. 
In examining the development of the BEF’s tank communications system during the First World War, this chapter has shown that although the BEF did achieve a properly organised system of communications for tanks by the end of the war, the limitations of the communications technology at the time, combined with the inadequacies of the tanks themselves, continued to impose profound restrictions on the tactical and operational effectiveness of tanks in battle. Thus, the argument made by some historians that, ‘if properly used, and available in sufficient numbers, tanks could have played a more decisive role in 1918’, is not supported by the weight of evidence on the early attempts to build and improve communications in the British Army’s Tank Corps.​[98]​
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